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Abstract
Content validity, the extent to which a measurement reflects the specific intended
domain of content, is a basic type of validity for a valid measurement. It has usually
been examined using qualitative methods and has not been given as much attention as
the other psychometric properties such as internal consistency reliability, indicator
reliability and construct validity in the IS field. In this paper, a quantitative approach
including the proportion of substantive agreement (PSA), and substantive validity
(CSV) was used to examine content validity for 80 items covering eighth domains
related to organizational and individual perspectives of information security. The
content validity for the organizational perspective was examined using data from a
total of 56 content domain experts. Data from 51 experts were further used to examine
content validity for the individual perspective of information security. 31 items did
not have an adequate content validity, leaving the instrument with 49 items that have
been evaluated for their content validity and can be used in future empirically tests of
hypotheses in the information security field. To the knowledge of the authors this
quantitative method to assess content validity of items in the process of developing
instruments hasn’t yet been applied in the field information security.

Keywords
Content validity, Information security, quantitative methods, Anderson and Gerbing
method.

1. Introduction
The effectiveness and robustness of technical security components has made it more
difficult to successfully attack an organization’s computer systems using purely
technical means. Many attackers have therefore started to attack the humans accessing
and using the computers systems by exploiting human insecure behavior and
manipulating people into performing actions that benefits the attacker (Applegate,
2009). This development forces organizations’ to structure and organize their
information security efforts to ensure that risks related to human aspects of
information security can be managed effectively throughout the organization. To aid
and guide managers in selecting and developing effective ways of organizing
information security efforts, appropriate assessment tools are needed. Several
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instruments have therefore been developed by researchers to support evaluations of
information security behavior and understand determinants of such behavior. These
instruments have usually focused on investigating individual perceptions of external
cues and properties that determine adherence to information security policies and are
based on a variety of theories including theory of planned behavior (Bulgurcu,
Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010), general deterrence theory (Lee, Lee, & Yoo, 2004)
and learning theory (Warkentin, Johnston, & Shropshire, 2011). Other instruments
have largely focused on measuring success rates of certain types of security attacks,
(Dodgejr, Carver, & Ferguson, 2007), or capturing characteristics that explain an
individual’s susceptibility to these attacks (Pattinson, Jerram, Parsons, McCormac, &
Butavicius, 2012). Instruments to measure the effect of key organizational constructs
proposed in organizational and individual behavior literature, on information security
has, however, not been rigorously examined (Hu, Dinev, Hart, & Cooke, 2012).
This article reports on results towards the development of a measurement instrument
capturing organizational and individual perspectives of information security needed to
shape information security behavior. In particular, this article reports on the
examination of the content validity of a set of items related to these two aspects of
information security. Content validity “the degree to which items in an instrument
reflect the content universe to which the instrument will be generalized (Straub,
Boudreau, & Gefen, 2004, p. 424)”, has usually been examined qualitatively (e.g.
Brod, Tesler, & Christensen (2009)) and have not be given as much attention as the
other psychometric properties such as internal consistency reliability, indicator
reliability and construct validity .
Content validation is an assessment that consists of two stages: development and
judgment-quantification (Lynn, 2006). The development stage consists of domain
identification, item generation, and instrument construction (this stage is presented in
section “Conceptual framework”). Judgment-quantification, entails asking a number
of experts to evaluate the validity of the items and as a set (DeVellis, 1991). In the
present study, the proportion of substantive agreement (PSA), and substantive validity
(CSV) is used to examine items for their content validity (the method proposed by
Anderson & Gerbing (1991) is introduced in section “Method”). Besides providing a
statistical result to assess the adequacy of content validity of each item, the method
does not make any implicit assumptions about the direction of the relationship
between the items and their corresponding factors or about the correlations between
the items themselves. Therefore, it can be used to assess the content validity of either
formative or reflective indicators (MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & Podsakoff, 2011). This is
a fundamental advantage when developing formative items to capture a construct as a
lack of content validity is a particularly serious problem for constructs with formative
indicators (Petter, Straub, & Rai, 2007).
The investigated items were tested for their content validity by collecting data using
an email survey distributed to content domain experts. The result of the survey is a set
of items that have been evaluated for their content validity and can be used for future
empirically tests of hypotheses in the information security field. This is the main
contribution of the study.
The rest of the article unfolds as follows. In the next section the conceptual
foundation for developing the items is presented. Then, the method to assess content
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validity is discussed together with an outline of the data collection procedure and
analysis. In the section that follows the results from the content validity study are
presented and discussed. The last section concludes the article.

2. Conceptual framework
The conceptual foundation for developing items representing constructs related to
organizational and individual perspectives of information security was established
through two studies. These studies follow the recommendations given by MacKenzie,
Podsakoff, & Podsakoff (2011) for developing a measurement instrument. Firstly,
organizational and individual constructs, that influence information security behavior,
were identified using an inductive method approach. In a second study, the nature of
the constructs’ conceptual domain was specified and content domain experts were
surveyed on the relevance and comprehensiveness of the given construct’s
dimensions. In the following subsections, the identified constructs are presented. For
a detailed description of how the constructs were identified the reader is referred to
Rocha Flores & Ekstedt (2012) and Rocha Flores & Korman (2012).

2.1 Individual perspective
The identified individual constructs are related to perceptions of organizational
information security policies, practices, procedures and the social conditions within
an organizational setting. 46 items were generated based on the conceptual definition
of each construct. Table 1 depicts the items.
Information Security Leadership (ISL) concerns the information security leader’s
actions to motivate employees to adopt a security-savvy behavior. The definition of
the construct is based on the Transformational leadership concept (Bass & Riggio,
2006). In the context of information security, the concept points out that the leader
should articulate a security vision so that all employees can easily and clearly
understand what the aim of information security efforts is in the organization. The
leader should also show a reasonable level of mastery, and make it clear for each
employee what role s/he plays in the organization’s information security efforts, what
his/her responsibilities are and whom to turn to in case of a concern. The information
security leader’s actions should portray information security efforts as businesssupportively protective and collective and promote understanding and cooperation as
a means of achieving and maintaining effective information security. The information
security leader’s actions should finally set expectations, as well as provide contingent
reward (i.e., punishing non-compliance and negligence while rewarding success
stories and exemplary behavior).
Information Security Awareness (ISA) concerns an individual’s perception of both
his/her general knowledge about information security (e.g. value of assets, threat
exposure given circumstances, vulnerabilities and risks) and his/her cognizance of the
information security policies in an organization in order to shape employee behavior
that is conducive to the protection of information assets. The concept is based on the
definition made by Bulgurcu et al., (2010) and the findings in Rocha Flores & Ekstedt
(2012).
Learning Oriented Environment (LOE) concerns an individual’s perception of the
support, possibilities and encouragement of learning within the organizational
environment. The concept was developed based on Social learning theory (Bandura,
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1977; Warkentin, Johnston, & Shropshire, 2011). The concept concerns an
individual’s perception of the availability of support when performing a work task
(e.g., situational support from colleagues or a superior), an individual’s perception of
verbal feedback being provided regarding information security while performing
work tasks etc. (e.g., informal verbal warning, coaching, dialogues or discussions) and
observation- and imitation-based learning from colleagues, co-motivated through
seeing a colleague successfully perform a task.
Social Information Security Culture (SISC) concerns an individual’s perception of
shared beliefs and values among colleagues in the work environment (Chow & Chan,
2008). The concept further points out the quality (e.g., richness and friendliness) of
social relationships at the workplace.

2.2 Organizational perspective
An individual’s perception of information security can be influenced by management
actions that promote good information security practices through clear direction, and
provide knowledge of what is necessary for managing information security risks (Von
Solms & Von Solms, 2006). These actions can be deployed trough security structures,
processes and transferring mechanisms. 34 items were generated based on the
conceptual definition of each construct related to organizational perspective of
information security. Table 2 depicts the items.
Organizational Structure (OS) involve the existence of responsible functions such
as senior-level information security executives and the establishment of a committee
comprised of business and security personnel (Kayworth & Whitten, 2010). The
structure of clear and unambiguous definitions of the roles and responsibilities of the
involved parties throughout the whole organization are prerequisites for effective
information security.
Strategic Information Security Processes (SISP) refer to a formal and systematic
set of activities with the purpose of maintaining an actual picture of assets, threats,
weaknesses, existing countermeasures and finally risks, with regards to information
security. Further, the concepts refer to the planning for information security (e.g.,
acquisition of countermeasures, training and education, exercises) and monitoring the
state of information security, as well as the performance of information security
efforts and countermeasures (e.g., structures, rules or systems) in the organization.
Security Knowledge Transfer (SKT) refers to the process of capturing and sharing
knowledge about information security among organizational members through formal
and informal information flows. The formal activities aims at training employees on
compliance with actual information security policies in the organization and training
employees on general information security threats (e.g., threats relevant while
browsing the Internet, using e-mail for correspondence, or telephone communication).
The informal activities aim at sharing knowledge and experience regarding
information security matters (e.g., meetings, seminars or workshops).
Use of IT for Knowledge Transfer (ITKT) refers to the utilization of IT resources
(e.g., IT solutions and/or devices) in order to aid spreading, sharing and maintenance
of information security awareness and knowledge in the organization.
4

3. Method
3.1 Rationale for choosing the Anderson and Gerbing method
Methods for quantitatively measuring content validity include experts rating item
relevance to the domain of content using a Likert-type rating scale. The proportion of
experts who are in agreement about item relevance then provides a quantitative
measure of Content Validity Index (CVI), which has become very popular to use in
the nursing and health research field. However, the index has been criticized to give
different results depending on how it’s used (Polit & Beck, 2006).
A promising method to assess the content validity is the method proposed by Hinkin
& Tracey (1999) as illustrated by Yao, Wu, & Yang (2007) and recommended by
MacKenzie et al., (2011). The raters are asked to rate the extent to which each item
(listed in rows) captures each construct (listed at the top of the columns) using a five
point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (completely). However, this
method has its limitations. The method includes a one-way repeated measures
ANOVA to assess whether an item’s mean rating on one construct differs from its
ratings on other construct, and because each rater makes multiple ratings for each
item, it would only be appropriate to use a one-way between-subjects ANOVA to
analyze the data if the ratings of each item on each construct were provided by
different raters. This would require substantially more subjects and the test of the item
rating differences across the constructs (MacKenzie et al., 2011). Further, it is
important to avoid overburdening the raters, and using one-way between-subjects
ANOVA would require us to limit the amount of items that we wanted to include in
the content validity assessment survey. In a study by Yao, Wu, & Yang (2007) the
Anderson and Gerbing sorting method and Hinkin & Tracey method were compared
and gave similar results. However, due to the large number of items in our study the
Anderson and Gerbing sorting method (Anderson & Gerbing, 1991) was chosen to
decrease the time needed to complete the survey and thus avoid overburdening the
raters.

3.2 Selection of participants
When selecting people to serve as raters, it is important to make sure that they have
sufficient intellectual ability to understand and complete the survey. We therefore
argue that the raters both need knowledge in the field of information security and
have sufficient intellectual ability. Consequently we approached content domain
experts to act as raters.
A thorough selection of experts based on expert criteria is important in order to assure
reliability and quality of the study (Weiss & Shanteau, 2003). The experts were
identified from scientific articles from searches in professional societies’ databases
such as the IEEE and in pure indexing databases such as SCOPUS. The search criteria
involved combinations of topic-words such as “information security”, “information
security behavior” ”information security governance”, and ”information security
management” with research area limitations such as ”knowledge sharing” and ”IT
governance”. The resulting selections of articles were then manually screened, based
on title and abstract (if sufficient) or full content (if necessary) to determine whether
the authors should be invited to participate or not. The searches were limited in time
to the past three years, i.e. only publications from 2008 and onward were selected. In
all, 452 content domain experts were invited to participate.
5

3.3 The survey
As the experts consulted in this study were geographically widely spread, an e-mail
survey was used. Invitations to respond to an electronic survey were sent in October
of 2012 to the sample of content domain experts. The survey was hosted by a widely
used internet-based application (SurveyMonkey) and open for answering during four
weeks. Two reminders were sent to non-responding participants after a first week and
a second week in order to increase the response rate (Blaxter, Hughes, & Tight,
2010). The survey consisted of five pages of which the first provided an introduction
to the survey, and guidance for completing the survey. The second page included
questions used to assess background information of respondents. The two following
pages of the survey consisted of two matrixes (one for the organizational perspective
containing 34 items and one for the individual perspective containing 46 items) in
which definitions of the constructs established in Rocha Flores & Korman (2012)
were listed at the top of the columns and the items, that all were randomly ordered,
listed in the rows. The experts were asked to read each item and assign it to the
construct that they, in their judgment, the item best indicate (Anderson & Gerbing,
1991).
The survey also included questions about the comprehensiveness of the items, i.e. if
there are any important items missing to capture the construct domain, and the
understandability of the items, i.e. if the items are constructed improperly and if there
are any potential misspellings. For each matrix the respondents were asked to give
qualitative opinions on the given set of items in order to assure that all items related to
the constructs have been taken into account and are constructed properly.

3.4 Analysis
From the responses the two indices proportion of substantive agreement (PSA) and
substantive validity coefficient (CSV) as proposed by Anderson and Gerbing where
calculated.
The proportion of substantive agreement is calculated in the following way:

Where nc is the number respondents that have assigned the item to the intended
construct and N is the total number of respondents. The proportion of substantive
agreement can vary between 0.0 and 1.0. A higher number indicate that more
respondents have assigned the item to the intended construct.
The substantive validity coefficient is calculated by:

Where nc and N is still defined as above and where no is the most assigned constructs
excluding the intended. The substantive validity coefficient can vary between the
values -1.0 and 1.0. A positive number indicates that the item is assigned to the
intended construct more often than any other construct. Analogously a negative value
indicates that the intended construct is assigned more often to another construct then
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the intended. There are no criterion values for PSA and CSV. In line with the arguments
by Yao, Wu, & Yang (2007) on criterion values and due to fact that there are four
constructs in both the investigated perspectives of information security we used 0.30
as the threshold value for both PSA and CSV. The expected value for PSA, for instance,
is 0.25 if an item is randomly assigned. Thus, choosing 0.30 as the criterion value is
higher than 0.25 and items with either a PSA or CSV below 0.30 were deemed to have
insufficient content validity.

4. Results and discussions
Out of a total of 452 e-mail requests that where sent 21 bounced or were unregistered
from the mailing list. After two reminders 115 had opened the survey and 56
respondents had completed the survey for the organizational perspective (13%)
containing and 51 for the individual perspective (11.8%). In the judgmentquantification process, a minimum of three experts are advised by Lynn (2006), while
others have recommended from 2 to 20 experts (Gable & Wolf, 1993). In the present
study, the number of members necessary for a panel greatly exceeds the
recommended threshold.

4.1 Individual perspective
Table 1 contains the items and substantive agreement for each construct for each item
and the substantive validity coefficient for the items posited construct. There were 15
items that had insufficient content validity (item 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 40, 41,
42, 43, 44 and 46) with the cut points for PSA and CSV at 0.30 for both values. Five
items were transferred to SISC as they fulfilled the threshold values for transferring
items according to Anderson and Gerbing method. One item (item 27) was originally
in the ISL construct. Four items (item 36, 37, 38 and 39) was originally in the LEO
construct. The results show that all items representing ISA and SISC had an adequate
content validity. However, the consensus regarding items representing ISL and LOE
is rather low. For instance, item 2 (“The way our top management talks and behaves
makes it clear to me what part I play in achieving and maintaining effective
information security.”) had a value close to the threshold, but many experts also
perceived that the item represent ISA. This result is rather confusing due to the fact
that the item explicitly contains the words “management” and “behaves”. Item 9
(“Eventual faults and mistakes with a potential to compromise information security
are looked upon as serious in our organization, yet still as a source of learning rather
than a reason for punishment”) and item 11 (“Employees in our organization are
expected to learn from security weaknesses, faults and incidents (own as well as
others') as to promote excellence.”) should not measure ISL, but rather measure LOE.
Both items contain the word “learn”, which could have influenced the judgment of the
experts. Item 41 (“I feel welcome to ask colleagues for advice or help in case of an
information security concern.”) and 46 (“I have had opportunities to observe people at
work in order to improve myself with regards to information security.”) were both
close to the threshold, but were also perceived by the experts to measure SISC and
could therefore not be regarded as items with a sufficient content validity. The same
holds for item 42-45.

4.2 Organizational perspective
Table 2 contains the items and substantive agreement for each construct for each item
and the substantive validity coefficient for the items posited construct. There were 16
7

items that had insufficient content validity (item 4, 5, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20,
21, 25, 27, 31 and 33) with the cut points for PSA and CSV at 0.30 for both values. One
item (item 7) was originally in the OS construct but the results showed that they
fulfilled the threshold values for transferring items to SISP.
The remaining results show that low consensus regarding the content validity of items
could be found in all domains. Differentiating between OS and SISP seems to be
challenging. For instance, item 5 (“Information security responsibilities are defined
for each and every employee.”) was generated to measure OS but there were many
experts that believed the item should measure SISP. Further, item 13 (“At some level
in the organization, establishment of, changes to and disposal of information security
controls is being discussed and decided upon.”) and 15 (“Information security
planning is done regularly, in systematic and formalized ways.”) were both generated
to measure SISP, but some experts believed that the items should measure OS and
therefore they both were deemed to have insufficient content validity.
Item 27 (“Employees with dedicated information security responsibilities are striving
to achieve and maintain friendly relationships to other employees.”) were generated to
capture the informal security knowledge transfer activities, but the yielded value were
far from the threshold. In fact, many experts believed the item should measure OS or
SISP. This gives an indication of the challenges that exists when trying to capture
concepts that could be interpreted as “vague” and containing “informal” items.
Item 31 (“There is a system, which provides real-time advice on performed tasks,
including advice on information security.”) had a value close to the threshold. The
item was generated to capture ITKT, but the experts perceived that the items also
could measure SISP. One explanation for not having a value over the threshold could
be that the item contains a general word “system” and not a specific word such as
“IT-system”, which could have confused the panel members.
Domain and item

N

PSA

CSV

ISL

ISA

SISC

LOE

Information Security Leadership
1.

Top management in my organization clearly expresses
what the aim of the information security efforts is in our
organization is.

51

0,69

0,20

0,04

0,08

0,49

The way our top management talks and behaves makes
it clear to me what part I play in achieving and
maintaining effective information security.

51

0,51

0,27

0,10

0,12

0,24

The information security leader shows a reasonable level
of mastery (knowledge and skills) in the field of
information security.

51

0,67

0,22

0,04

0,08

0,45

4.

The information security leader portrays information
security a collective effort.

51

0,65

0,12

0,18

0,06

0,47

5.

The information security leader promotes shared
understanding, communication and cooperation as a
means of achieving and maintaining effective information
security across the organization.

51

0,71

0,08

0,16

0,06

0,55

The information security leader portrays information
security as a supportively protective effort towards
primary business activities and information values, rather
than a limiting factor based on formal regulations and
best practice.

51

0,63

0,14

0,18

0,06

0,45

2.

3.

6.
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7.

Employees are required to behave in way as to protect
information values and business activities in our
organization (also termed due care).

51

0,31

0,27

0,33

0,08

-0,02

Employees are required to investigate consequences of
their actions given circumstances as to protect
information values and business activities in our
organization (also termed due diligence).

51

0,27

0,27

0,24

0,22

0,00

Eventual faults and mistakes with a potential to
compromise information security are looked upon as
serious in our organization, yet still as a source of
learning rather than a reason for punishment.

51

0,16

0,10

0,27

0,47

-0,31

10. Difficulties to behave in a secure manner towards
information assets and business activities are followed up
and actively worked with.

51

0,20

0,18

0,41

0,22

-0,22

11. Employees in our organization are expected to learn from
security weaknesses, faults and incidents (own as well as
others') as to promote excellence.

51

0,08

0,18

0,35

0,39

-0,31

12. Deliberate incompliance or negligence of due care / due
diligence is being punished (e.g., through personal
feedback with duty reminder, or a formal disciplinary
process).

51

0,35

0,18

0,33

0,14

0,18

13. Successful steps to incident-prevention or effective
incident handling are rewarded (e.g., through personal
feedback and/or benefits).

51

0,18

0,22

0,31

0,29

-0,14

14. Successful steps to incident-prevention or effective
incident handling are made visible as to exemplify and
encourage such behavior.

51

0,25

0,22

0,35

0,18

-0,10

15. I am familiar with the content of our organization's
information security policy.

51

0,14

0,71

0,08

0,08

0,57

16. I know what the information security policy describes as
acceptable use of e-mail.

51

0,08

0,69

0,18

0,06

0,51

17. I know what the information security policy describes as
acceptable use of Internet and social media.

51

0,08

0,73

0,10

0,10

0,63

18. I know what the information security policy describes as
acceptable use of telephone.

51

0,06

0,71

0,20

0,04

0,51

19. I know what the information security policy requires and
forbids regarding management and use of computer
passwords.

51

0,04

0,65

0,22

0,10

0,43

20. I know how the information security policy regulates work
with and disposal of sensitive information

51

0,08

0,69

0,16

0,08

0,53

21. I know how the information security policy regulates
disposal and recirculation of devices.

51

0,10

0,67

0,14

0,10

0,53

22. I know what the information security policy says about
installing custom software.

51

0,12

0,73

0,06

0,10

0,61

23. Overall, I am aware of potential information security
threats related to my work and the organization's
business activities, as well as the negative consequences
they may cause.

51

0,06

0,71

0,20

0,04

0,51

24. I have sufficient knowledge about how much it costs my
organization to face potential security incidents.

51

0,06

0,69

0,18

0,08

0,51

25. I understand concerns regarding information security and
the risks that information security threats pose in general.

51

0,08

0,65

0,22

0,06

0,43

26. In each work situation I am aware of the information
security issues that can be caused or allowed for through
my actions as well as eventual negligence.

51

0,06

0,65

0,14

0,16

0,49

51

0,20

0,10

0,65

0,06

0,45

8.

9.

Information Security Awareness

Social Information Security Culture
27. In our organization, information security is viewed as a
collective responsibility.
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28. I have good relationships with my colleagues and other
organizational members.

51

0,16

0,10

0,67

0,08

0,51

29. I am close to my colleagues and other organizational
members with regards to communication, cooperation
and placement.

51

0,10

0,24

0,55

0,12

0,31

30. Colleagues in my department cooperate well with each
other.

51

0,12

0,16

0,61

0,12

0,45

31. Colleagues in my department have a strong feeling of
together being one team

51

0,12

0,06

0,69

0,14

0,55

32. In my department, there is a significant perception of
having common goals.

51

0,14

0,14

0,59

0,14

0,45

33. Both my colleagues and I agree on the fact that
protection of assets such as information, data and our
computer environment from getting compromised (e.g.,
unauthorized disclosed, manipulated, infected by viruses
or malware, or suddenly unavailable) is important.

51

0,04

0,18

0,61

0,18

0,43

34. Both my colleagues and I share the same ambitions and
vision of protecting information assets from being
compromised in our organization.

51

0,14

0,18

0,63

0,06

0,45

35. Both my colleagues and I share and agree on the way
collective information security goals are being pursued in
our organization.

51

0,06

0,25

0,59

0,10

0,33

36. My colleagues would warn me if they saw me doing
something (e.g., using computer, or disposing sensitive
information) in an unsecure way.

51

0,06

0,16

0,69

0,10

0,53

37. My colleagues expect me to warn them if I saw them
doing something in an unsecure way.

51

0,06

0,20

0,65

0,10

0,45

38. Providing verbal feedback regarding information security
between colleagues is generally accepted in my
organization.

51

0,06

0,16

0,55

0,24

0,31

39. When I see my colleagues working and behaving in a
secure way complying to the information security policies
and guidelines, it makes me willing to also do so.

51

0,08

0,16

0,57

0,20

0,37

40. I find that my organization's resources effectively support
me to prevent my information assets from eventually
getting compromised (e.g., that some sensitive
information gets disclosed damaged, or a virus infects my
computer).

51

0,16

0,20

0,33

0,31

-0,02

41. I feel welcome to ask colleagues for advice or help in
case of an information security concern.

51

0,08

0,12

0,55

0,25

0,29

42. I feel welcome to ask my superior or an information
security responsible person for advice or help in case of
an information security concern.

51

0,22

0,24

0,27

0,27

-0,29

43. Informal communication or discussions regarding
information security phenomena are welcome among
colleagues in my organization.

51

0,06

0,14

0,43

0,37

-0,06

44. I feel encouraged to learn or improve at a skill when I see
a colleague mastering it.

51

0,04

0,22

0,33

0,41

0,08

45. I have learned to work more secure or improved my
information security skills through observing my
colleagues at work and taking example.

51

0,04

0,16

0,24

0,57

0,33

46. I have had opportunities to observe people at work in
order to improve myself with regards to information
security.

51

0,10

0,22

0,22

0,47

0,25

Learning Oriented Environment

Table 1: Results for the proportion of substantive agreement (PSA) and substantive
validity coefficient (CSV) calculations for the individual perspective.
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Domain and item

N

PSA

CSV

OS

SISP

SKT

ITKT

Organizational Structure
1.

We have an organizational unit with explicit responsibility for
organizing and coordinating information security efforts as well as
handling incidents.

56

0,70

0,18

0,09

0,04

0,52

2.

There is a committee, comprised of representatives from various
business units, which coordinates corporate security initiatives

56

0,64

0,16

0,13

0,07

0,48

3.

There is a committee, which deals with matters of strategic
information security and related decision making.

56

0,59

0,27

0,11

0,04

0,32

4.

In our organization, security personnel and line people frequently
attend cross-functional meetings.

56

0,27

0,43

0,18

0,13

-0,16

5.

Information security responsibilities are defined for each and
every employee.

56

0,48

0,27

0,18

0,07

0,21

6.

Tactical and operative managers are involved in information
security decision making, which is related to their unit,
responsibilities and/or subordinates.

51

0,61

0,18

0,20

0,02

0,41

In our organization, security responsibles and representatives
from various business units meet to discuss important security
issues both formally and informally.

56

0,16

0,54

0,16

0,14

0,38

8.

Information about risks across business processes is considered.

56

0,21

0,54

0,11

0,14

0,32

9.

Information about risk on organizational assets is communicated
from top down.

56

0,41

0,29

0,14

0,16

-0,13

10. Vulnerabilities in the information systems and related processes
are identified regularly.

56

0,20

0,50

0,20

0,11

0,30

11. Threats that could harm and adversely affect critical operations
are identified regularly.

56

0,11

0,61

0,16

0,13

0,45

12. Strategic choices and decisions regarding information security,
such as investments, are being discussed and considered in the
organization.

56

0,38

0,54

0,07

0,02

0,16

13. At some level in the organization, establishment of, changes to
and disposal of information security controls is being discussed
and decided upon.

56

0,32

0,57

0,09

0,02

0,25

14. Information security operations, audits and/or exercises are
regularly being planned for in the organization.

56

0,18

0,46

0,25

0,11

0,21

15. Information security planning is done regularly, in systematic and
formalized ways.

56

0,29

0,57

0,05

0,09

0,29

16. Breaches, damage to information assets and other information
security incidents are being reported to a responsible
organizational unit, person or a dedicated system.

56

0,39

0,38

0,16

0,07

-0,02

17. Performance of information security controls is measured, for
example with regards to the amount of protection they provide as
well as the obtrusiveness and performance limitations they pose
to personnel, systems and business activities.

56

0,20

0,52

0,16

0,13

0,32

18. In internal interviews or surveys, questions regarding information
security are being asked.

56

0,07

0,54

0,25

0,14

0,29

19. Criteria of information security performance are explicit and clear
to the responsible personnel.

56

0,45

0,34

0,18

0,04

-0,11

20. There is an information policy document and/or information
security guidelines available to employees.

56

0,29

0,32

0,30

0,09

-0,02

21. Employees receive information about information security policy
and guidelines (such as the acceptable use of e-mail, Internet,
passwords, telephone, installing additional software etc.).

56

0,09

0,25

0,39

0,27

0,13

Strategic Information Security Process
7.

Security Knowledge Transfer
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22. Formal information security exercises take place in the
organization (e.g., training of backup procedures or reaction on
security incidents).

56

0,07

0,20

0,70

0,04

0,50

23. In the organization, there is a formal program for information
security awareness, training and education.

56

0,11

0,09

0,77

0,04

0,66

24. Employees receive information about information security threats
(i.e., which are those, how to avoid falling victim to them and/or
how to cope with them otherwise).

56

0,07

0,21

0,54

0,18

0,32

25. There are informal social arrangements, meetings, seminars or
workshops directed at sharing experience or knowledge about
information security, among other.

56

0,11

0,23

0,46

0,20

0,23

26. The organization provides informal/voluntary consulting and
advisory services in information security for its employees.

56

0,11

0,14

0,54

0,21

0,32

27. Employees with dedicated information security responsibilities are
striving to achieve and maintain friendly relationships to other
employees.

56

0,36

0,36

0,14

0,14

-0,21

28. In the organization, there is an atmosphere where learning is
actively encouraged.

56

0,21

0,14

0,57

0,07

0,36

29. There is an intranet site dedicated to information security (e.g.,
general threats and how tos, policy and guidelines).

56

0,11

0,14

0,18

0,57

0,39

30. There is an intranet site, a quality control system or another
information system or portal, which contains work- and taskrelated information security information such as cues, reminders
or warnings bound to an action, process or a situation.

56

0,07

0,20

0,14

0,59

0,39

31. There is a system, which provides real-time advice on performed
tasks, including advice on information security.

56

0,13

0,23

0,14

0,50

0,27

32. Information technology is actively used to share knowledge and
experience regarding information security within the organization.

56

0,05

0,14

0,13

0,68

0,54

33. In our organization, managers are good at using IT to
communicate security-related information with employees

56

0,14

0,23

0,16

0,46

0,23

34. The company saves and renews important knowledge on both
general information security and threats related to information
security onto the computer for easy browsing.

56

0,09

0,16

0,18

0,57

0,39

Use of IT for Knowledge Transfer

Table 2: Results for the proportion of substantive agreement (PSA) and substantive
validity coefficient (CSV) calculations for the organizational perspective.

4.3 Qualitative comments and item modifications
No comments were received on wording or potential misspellings of each individual
item. We explicitly asked for comments to cover this aspect, however, one reason for
the lack of comments on this aspect could be that the experts perceived the survey to
be time-consuming. Therefore, the experts chose to conduct the item sorting test and
leave general comments on the survey and item comprehensiveness, but felt that
leaving comments on wording and potential misspellings, for 80 individual items, was
far too demanding.
Most of the general comments were encouraging and experts perceived that that the
coverage appears comprehensive and well-documented, that the items are relevant
and that the approach is interesting. Two general comments pertain to the amount of
items and that the survey contains far too many questions. One respondent shared the
following.
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“The coverage of the survey is comprehensive. Questions could have been simplified
a bit as less experienced professionals may have intimidated by the size of question in
the matrix (…)
Regarding comments on the understandability of specific items, item 27 is critiqued
by one expert for the vague definition of “friendly relationship”.
“Friendly relationship seemed to be a strange question - if there are employees with
information security responsibilities, why are not their other tasks discussed.”
Four comments pertain to the conceptualization of the constructs and how they are
defined. This is problem that needs more attention as argued by MacKenzie et al.,
(2011). Two respondents shared the following related to this issue.
“The categories were vague and many of the items could fit in multiple categories.
Perhaps some example classifications could be provided to help with understanding
what the categories mean and how to discriminate between them.”
“The requested exercise is too informal (the categories proposed are somewhat
unclear and the statements to be classified alike).”
Although the constructs were conceptualized in Rocha Flores & Korman (2012) and
the items have been categorized accordingly, there are still challenges related to this
process. The comments provide further evidence on the challenges regarding informal
constructs that can be perceived to be “vague” such as LOE (where only one out of
seven items was assessed to have adequate content validity). We therefore highlight
the importance of a rigorous conceptualization process that clearly and
unambiguously defines the constructs before generating items that are intended to
represent the constructs.

5. Conclusions
The purpose of the paper was to examine content validity for 80 items related to
organizational and individual information security perspectives. The items were
generated based on a conceptual foundation that was established through two previous
research studies. The items were tested for their content validity by collecting
quantitative data from a sample of 56 respondents (organizational perspective) and 51
for the (individual perspective). 49 out of 80 items were found to have an adequate
content validity regarding to proportion of substantive agreement (PSA), and
substantive validity (CSV). As the content validity of items has usually been examined
qualitatively and have not be given as extensive attention as the other psychometric
properties such as internal consistency reliability, indicator reliability and construct
validity, the present paper is novel by demonstrating how to quantitatively examine
the content validity of generated items in the information security field.
The results shows that the consensus for two domains is high (ISA and SISC).
Significant differences of how the experts assess the content validity of items were
identified in the remaining investigated domains. We have further provided our
opinions on why some items didn’t have an adequate content validity.
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The method that was used to assess content validity relies on experts’ judgments.
However, we would also like to recognize that the finding in the current study may be
influenced meanings of items from experts’ viewpoints rather than survey
respondents’ perspective. Future studies could take this into consideration when
assessing content validity using quantitative methods.
In the next phase of the research, empirical data will be collected using the key
informant methodology in which respondents will be chosen based on their position,
experience and professional knowledge. After conducting pilot tests, empirical data
will be collected from two key-informants per organization – one respondent from the
security organization, and one with a role that includes regular utilization of
information technology products and services, e.g. computers, Internet access,
electronic mail, etc. (at least ten respondents per organization). To be able to identify
differences based on observed heterogeneity, data will be collected from a population
with varying characteristics (age, gender, experience etc.) and from organizations
covering a comprehensive range of industries in Scandinavia.
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